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INTRODUCTION
THE THEORY of the general competitive equilibrium, as developed by Leon Walras [64] , has recently been reformulated in terms of fairly advanced mathematical methods. The first problem studied extensively was concerned with the conditions under which a competitive equilibrium exists for a model of general equilibrium. Among contributions to the existence problem, Wald [63] , Arrow and Debreu [5] , McKenzie [35] , Nikaido [48] , Gale [18] , and Negishi [44] may be cited. The optimality problem of a competitive equilibrium was also investigated by, e.g., Arrow [2] , Debreu [15, 16] , and, in greater detail, by Hurwicz [27] . However, it was not until the paper by Arrow and Hurwicz [6] was published that the stability problem of a competitive economy was investigated systematically within the framework of general equilibrium analysis.
The purpose of the present article is to survey some of the more important recent contributions to the theory of the stability of a competitive economy. After a general discussion of the nature of the stability problem (Section 2) and a short review of the earlier literature (Section 3), I shall proceed to define a model (Section 4) and present various results on the stability of the McManus [12] , Arrow and Nerlove [13] , and Enthoven and Arrow [17] ). But such an extension is possible only under such special assumptions as that the behavior of individuals in the current period is not affected by that of past periods.
It has often been assumed in the model of the market clearing process -and in this article we shall assume-that prices move in accord with the excess demand (demand minus supply) in each market7 and that the demand for and supply of commodities are functions of prices. The latter assumption is again justified if individual consumption and production plans respond rapidly relative to price changes.
In the case of constant returns to scale, however, the demand for and supply of commodities from a firm cannot be well-behaved functions of prices. Since in this case profit is proportional to scale at any given set of prices, the profit-maximizing scale may be infinite, if positive profits are possible at some level. Or it may be that there are zero profits at all scales, in which case profit maximization does not define the behavior of firms. Finally, if profits are negative at all positive scales, the optimal scale is zero. This is why Walras [64] , while assuming instantaneous utility maximization by the consumer, did not prescribe instantaneous profit maximization for firms. He assumed that the price change has the same sign as the excess demand, and that the change in the scale of production has the same sign as the marginal profitability of scale. This case, with lagged adjustments of producers, was recently treated by Morishima [40] . The excess demand model with lagged consumers' adjustments was, on the other hand, treated by Arrow and Hurwicz [6] .
The Marshallian process in which the response of output is governed by the excess demand price (demand price minus supply price) is not a market clearing process within a "week" but a long run process requiring several weeks in the sense of HIicks. Hicks [26, p. 62] argued, moreover, that the Marshallian process is appropriate to monopoly rather than to competition.
Let us now consider the reason for stability analysis.
The existence of general equilibrium is rigorously proved in the literature cited in Section 1 above. Does the existence proof not assure that equilibrium is really established? Here are the reasons why, in addition to the existence proof of equilibrium, some representation of the adjustment outside equilibrium must be provided, and its stability required, if the model of a competitive economy is to be entertained as a good description of the facts.
As Walras F641 observed, the equilibrium we obtain mathematically or theoretically is established empirically or practically in the market by the mechanism of competition. At the beginning of every period, markets are not necessarily in equilibrium, i.e., the supply of and demand for commodities are not necessarily equal, and the market clearing adjustment process begins to work. The competition of buyers and sellers alters prices. Prices rise for those commodities whose demand exceeds supply, and fall for those commodities where the reverse holds. We know from experience that under this process prices usually do not explode to infinity or contract to zero, but converge to an equilibrium such that the supply of and demand for commodities are equal. Hence, the process which we choose to represent reality must display the same stability. We must therefore search for intuitively appealing and widely acceptable conditions or restrictions on the model that are sufficient to ensure stability. The equilibrium once established in this way is continuously subject to changes and disturbances, such as of taste, technology, resources, and weather. Suppose the system, which has been in equilibrium, is thrown out of it by some of those changes or disturbances. It is known empirically that the economy is in fact fairly shock-proof. Dynamic market forces are generated which bring the economy back to equilibrium when it is perturbed, i.e., there exists a stable adjustment process when the economy is out of equilibrium. Realistic economic models should contain such a dynamic equilibrating process.
Furthermore, theories of trade cycles and of economic growth that are of the dynamic equilibrium type cited in Section 2.1 assume that temporary or short run equilibrium is easily and quickly established in each period and rapidly recovered when disturbed by shocks. Studies of the stability of the market clearing process do, therefore, offer to these theories some assurance concerning their fundamental assumptions.
Since welfare economics assures us that under certain assumptions a competitive equilibrium can be identified with an economic optimum (the optimality problem cited in Section 1), we may conclude that the competitive process towards market equilibrium is also a computational device for solving the problem of optimal resource allocation (Arrow and Hurwicz [10], Marschak [34] ). Indeed, Pareto [51] compared the market to a computing machine. Of course, the system of simultaneous equations describing the general equilibrium can be solved by some centralized procedure involving the use of computing machines rather than by the market which solves the problem under decentralization. A completely centralized organization would, however, require a capacity for the storage and processing of technological and other information that exceeds anything likely to be available. This is the reason why Lange [29] concluded that accounting prices in a socialist economy should be determined by a decentralized trial and error process in which the Central Planning Board performs the functions of the competitive market. Stability, then, is necessary for the competitive market mechanism to be a satisfactory practical device for solving the problem of optimum resource allocation. 8 So far we have been concerned with the reasons why models should satisfy sufficient conditions for stability-conditions which ensure the stability of the dynamic process. Most of the results so far obtained in the analysis of stability, which we are going to review in this article, are also concerned with sufficient conditions. One would, however, also like to know necessary conditions. Hicks [ 
2.3.
In this article we shall be concerned mainly with global stability, or stability in the large, which means that economic variables generated from the dynamic process approach some equilibrium in the limit as time becomes infinite, regardless of their initial values. Samuelson [54] called this perfect stability of the first kind. But there are a few other concepts of stability, some of which will be referred to in this article.
If equilibrium points are not distinct from each other but cover a whole line or region, we shall be concerned with quasi-stability which implies that variables converge to the set of equilibrium points, or more technically, that every limit point of the process is an equilibrium (Uzawa [60] ). To prove quasi-stability, it is sufficient to show that there is some continuous function of the relevant variables which is decreasing through time at disequilibria and that the domain of the variables is bounded, i.e., they do not go to positive or negative infinity. It is intuitively clear that stability is obtained if the distance in any sense from the present position to an equilibrium, or to a set of equilibria, is decreasing through time.9
The decrease of a continuous function of the variables, which is used in 8 Also, convergence of the process to some neighborhood of the equilibrium must be rapid enough for practical purposes. the proof of quasi-stability, is a sort of mathematical extension of the concept of decreasing distance.10 Global stability follows from quasi-stability when equilibrium is unique, or when equilibria are distinct from each other.
If the dynamic process is converging only when initial values of the variables are close to equilibrium values, we speak of local stability or stability of the first kind in the small. To prove stability in the small of a dynamic process, it is sufficient to consider a linear system approximating the process in the neighborhood of an equilibrium point. If equilibrium is unique, global stability implies local stability, but not vice versa. Sometimes global stability may seem to be rather too stringent a condition to impose on the system and, as Newman [47] states, not always to be preferred to local stability, since in every period the market clearing process starts from the historically given values of variables which are close to equilibrium rather than from "prix cries au hasard," and most of the disturbances or shocks in the economy are likely to be small in fact. Local stability, however, is sometimes unsatisfactory, since it is quite possible for there to be multiple equilibria, none of which is completely stable from the local point of view (attracting all neighboring points), while the system is, in its entirety, globally stable (approaches some equilibrium). In the study of global stability, we are concerned with the behavior of a whole system, say, a competitive economy, rather than with the stability of a particular equilibrium.
There are several other concepts of stability which we shall not be concerned with in this article. Among them, perhaps the most important is stability in the sense of Lyapunov [33] . This implies that variables remain close to equilibrium, without necessarily converging to it, when perturbed slightly.11 Samuelson's stability of the second kind [54] corresponds to this. In the theory of trade cycles, we have another concept of stability, that of orbital stability which means that the time paths of the variables converge not to a point but to the path of some periodic motion, i.e., in the long run the same cycle is repeated (Goodwin [19] ). In growth theory, relative stability, i.e., the convergence of the ratio of variables to that of the balanced growth path, is important (Solow and Samuelson [56] give a brief historical account on some of the early work on the stability analysis of a competitive economy.
Walras [64] offered two methods for solving the equations of the general economic equilibrium, the theoretical or mathematical solution, and the empirical or practical solution of the market. The former was merely to count the number of unknowns and of equations. This was criticized, among others, by Wald [63] . Recent studies on the existence of an equilibrium, cited in Section 1, solved this problem completely. The latter solution is that of tatonnement, a trial and error process representing the market mechanism under free competition.12 The stability of tatonnement, in which prices change in accord with excess demands, was not successfully shown by Walras, except for the case of the exchange of two commodities. The Walrasian stability condition for the case of two commodities is that if the price of one commodity in terms of the other (i.e., numeraire) is above the equilibrium price, there is an excess supply for that commodity, and if below equilibrium, an excess demand. Since the price rises if there is excess demand and falls if there is excess supply in the tatonnement, this stability condition implies that there are forces to bring the price back to the equilibrium.
The stability condition, given by Walras in the two commodity case, was generalized by Hicks [26] for the many commodity case. In order for equilibrium to be perfectly stable, according to Hicks, a rise of the price of any commodity above the equilibrium must be accompanied by an excess supply of that commodity, and a fall below the equilibrium by an excess demand, so that a force is generated to bring the changed price back to equilibrium. This behavior must hold regardless of the state of other markets, i.e., whether or not other prices are unchanged or adjusted so as to maintain equilibrium in the relevant markets. More technically, the sign of the derivative of excess demand of a commodity with respect to its own price must be negative, even when any arbitrary subset of other prices are kept unchanged while the remaining ones are adjusted so as to maintain equilibrium in the respective markets. This implies that the sign of the principal minors of the matrix, It is Samuelson [54] who, criticizing Hicks, first observed that we cannot consider the stability problem without specifying a dynamic adjustment process. He formulated the problem as a set of dynamic equations and gave mathematical conditions for the convergence of its solution, i.e., the stability of the equilibrium. For example, he considered the stability of a differential process, in which the instantaneous rate of change of the price of any good is proportional to its excess demand, the latter being regarded as a function of all prices. If excess demands are approximated linearly at equilibrium and speeds of adjustment (ratios of the rate of change of price to excess demand) are set equal to one, the stability condition is that the real part of all the characteristic roots of the matrix A above should be negative. This true dynamic stability condition is generally different from the Hicksian condition. The latter is neither necessary nor sufficient for the former.
Since the Hicksian condition is useful in comparative statics, the relationship between dynamic stability and Hicksian stability was explored by, e.g., Samuelson [ Samuelson and his followers did not, however, take full advantage of the implication of the assumptions underlying the perfectly competitive model.15 13 In the case of two commodities, the Hicksian condition coincides with the Walrasian condition. 14 Also, in most cases they examined stability in a small neighborhood of the equilibrium, i.e., local stability, by the method of linear approximation.
The nature of the competitive economy in its relation to the stability of the price adjustment process was first fully explored by Hahn [21] , Arrow and Hurwicz [6] , and Negishi [43] . It was proved, by use of Walras's law (Hahn, Arrow, and Hurwicz) or the homogeneity of demand functions with respect to all prices (Negishi) , that if all goods are gross substitutes, i.e., aij > 0, for all i :A j in the matrix A, not only do Hicksian and dynamic conditions coincide, as stated above, but also that dynamic stability itself necessarily holds. Our understanding of stability in the large, i.e., global stability, with due attention to the nonnegativity of prices,16 was developed by Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz [ 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODEL
4.1. We are now going to concentrate attention on a particular model in order to make our discussion more precise. In this subsection let us construct a static model of a pure exchange economy and derive the aggregate demands for commodities as functions of all prices. A model of the dynamic processes will be given in the next subsection. We confine ourselves to the case of a pure exchange economy for two reasons. First, almost all the essential problems in the stability analysis occur even in this simplest model of the economy; and, secondly, many of the works we are going to survey are studies of this case. The results in Sections 5 and 6 can, however, be extended to an economy with production, since the assumptions utilized in those sections concern aggregate excess demands which are derived as functions of all prices, when production plans react rapidly and well-behavedly, i.e., continuously to changes of prices (Section 2.1). Results in Sections 7-10, on the other hand, depend essentially on the properties of a pure exchange economy and no attempt has been made so far to extend them to models with production.
Suppose certain amounts of the initial stocks of commodities are distributed to each individual participant in the economy. Since there is no production, total stocks of commodities in the economy remain unchanged. Each individual strives to maximize his utility through exchanges of commodities subject to the price ratios which are given in the market. As a result, for each commodity a quantity is demanded which is a function of all 16 The nonnegativity problem in the study of the gradient method (a method to solve the programming problem) is developed in Arrow, Hurwicz, and Uzawa [11] . 17 The method used to prove stability in Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz [4] is generalized in Uzawa [60] from the point of view of Lyapunov [33] . prices. If this quantity happens to be equal to the total existing amount in the economy for each commodity, market prices are called equilibrium prices relative to the initial distribution of commodities. It must be noted that different initial distributions generally generate different equilibrium prices. Although this model is very simple, two fundamental economic laws can be derived: Walras' law and the homogeneity of demand functions with respect to prices. The former implies that the value of total demand of all commodities is always equal to that of total supply, while the latter implies that demand is not affected by a proportionate change of all prices. . See also Allais [1] . In the original version of tatonnement due to Walras [64] , it is assumed that the adjustment takes place not simultaneously in all markets but successively in one market after another. falls in the opposite case. In the case of the ideally well organized market, such as the stock exchange, grain markets, and fish markets, we may imagine for each commodity an auctioneer who, as an incarnation of the competitive force in the market, raises the price of the commodity at a rate proportional to the difference between demand and supply. Each individual regards the market price announced by the auctioneer as a given datum to which he must adjust himself, although the announced price is the result of the decisions of all individuals in the market. Each individual then reports his decision on demand to the auctioneer. In the case of a less organized market, we must admit that it is a serious question as to whose behavior is expressed by ( A differential system is said to be globally stable if, for any given initial values, the solution of the system through those values converges to some equilibrium of the system. In the case of (T), this means limt, P(t) P* where X;(P*) = X; for all j; and, in the case of (NT), limt ,,,P(t) P*, together with limt ,OOX(t) X* where X1 (P*, X*) = X1 for all j. A system is said to be quasi-stable if, for any initial values, every limit point of the solution of the system is an equilibrium: in the case of (T), lim, "P(t,) =P where X;(P*) = Xi for all j, and t -> oo as v -> oo; in the case of (NT), limv,'0P(tv) = P*, limv,oo X(tv) X* where Xi(P*, X*) = X1 for all j, and tv -> oo as v -> oo. Since the relevant variables P(t) andX(t) are bounded, it is sufficient for quasi-stability that there exists a continuous function V{P(t)} (or V {P(t), X(t)}) which is strictly decreasing through time unless XX X1 for all j. If equilibrium is unique, or if the equilibria are distinct from each other, quasi-stability coincides with global stability (Uzawa [60] ).
In the following three sections we discuss the stability and the instability of the tatonnement process, and in the last three sections we treat the nontatonnement process.
GROSS SUBSTITUTABILITY (ARROW, BLOCK, AND HURWICZ)
This section is devoted to one of the most important results obtained in studies of the stability of the tatonnement process (T), i.e., the global stability under gross substitutability due to Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz [ we have where Ii = E1P1Xwi, and from this we obtain aXjj > 0 for all P > 0, X > 0, j k.
Gross substitutability (S) is obtained by summing over i.
The balance of this subsection is devoted to a lemma due to Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz [4] concerning the uniqueness of the equilibrium price vector. Of course, the equilibrium price vector cannot be unique in the strict sense of the word. By (h), if P is an equilibrium, AP for any A > 0 is also an equilibrium. It will, however, be shown, under gross substitutability, that the equilibrium price ratios, or the equilibrium price ray, are unique, i.e., if P is an equilibrium, every other equilibrium can be expressed as AP for some A > 0. This uniqueness of the equilibrium ray is important for the proof of stability. Now we state:
LEMMA 1: Under assumfptions of positive homogeneity (h) and gross substitutability (S) of the demand function, the equilibrium price vector P is determined uniquely up to a scalar multiple.

A sketch of the proof is given below (Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz [4, Lemma 4]).
Suppose both P, P (P = AP for any 2 > 0) satisfy (e), and PJ/PJ = min-(P1/1P). By (h) we may replace P by P such that P = yP, u > 0 and Pj = Pj. Then P < P and hence by, (S) and (e), Xj(P) < XJ(P) = Xi, which contradicts the assumption that P is an equilibrium (Wald [63] In the case of two commodities, m = 2, the argument above can be seen graphically (see Figure 1) . Here we have J = 1, since PI/Pi < P2/P2. From (h) we have Xj(P) = Xj(P). Comparing P with P, we have, from (S), X1(P) < Xl(P), since P2 is higher than P2, while P1 = P.. Therefore, X1(P) # X1 and P does not satisfy (e) 
In this subsection, following a lemma concerning the relation between excess demands and prices under gross substitutability (S), the first proof of the stability of tatonnement (T) under gross substitutability is given.
By the use of both homogeneity (h) and Walras' law (W), an important lemma is obtained under the assumption of gross substitutability (S). for any P >0, P =A APfor any A >O0.
This lemma says that the sum of excess demands at any disequilibrium price situation weighted by equilibrium prices is always positive. In other words the weak axiom of revealed preference (Samuelson [54] ) is satisfied between the equilibrium point and any disequilibrium point.
In the case of two commodities, m = 2, we can show this graphically (see The point a represents the total stocks of the two commodities and, by definition, total demands at equilibrium prices P. The point b, corresponding to demands at P, is on the line cd which represents the price ratio of P and passes through a, since we have from (W), PiXI(P) + P2X2(P) = P1X1 + P2Y2. 
After establishing another lemma on the excess demands under gross substitutability (S), we shall give below the second proof of the stability of the tatonnement (T).
The following lemma is obtained by the assumptions of gross substitutability (S) and homogeneity (h). Then by hypothesis, P* < P and Pt*, = P1'. Hence, by (e), (h), and (S), Xx (P) = Xj (P*) < Xx (P) = X .
Similarly, with P* = (Pj /Pj )P' P P** p p** we have X1, (P) = X; (P**) > Xy'(P) = X, This lemma says that the commodity whose price is the maximum relative to the equilibrium price has a negative excess demand and, according to the tatonnement (T), its price is decreasing, while the commodity whose price is the minimum has a positive excess demand and its price is increasing. In the case of two commodities, m = 2, the above argument can be shown graphically (see Figure 3) . We have j' -1, j" = 2, since P1/P1 > P2/P2. Remembering that XjPj2(t) is constant, we know that P(t) must be on the curve ab (a part of a circle around 0). Pi is maximum and P2 is minimum relative to P. From Lemma 3, there is an excess supply of the first commodity and an excess demand for the second commodity. Therefore, P, goes down and P2 goes up, so that P(t) moves in the direction of P and finally gets there.
A CONTRIBUTION BY ALLAIS
A brief comment may be appropriate on the significance of the rather neglected contribution to this field by M . Allais [1, vol. 2, pp. 486-489 ] in 1943.
The stability of the Walrasian tatonnement is discussed. It must be mentioned first that the original model of the tatonnement due to Allais is not our tatonnement process (T) in the sense that price adjustment is assumed to take place not simultaneously in all markets but successively in one market after another (see footnote 21 above). Secondly, it must be noted that Allais did not assume gross substitutability (S) explicitly but made assumptions which, taken together, are essentially the same as the gross substitutability (S). Because K+ and J-, K-and J+ are non-overlapping, respectively, we have j # k in the above expression of Da(t) and by (S), aXj/aPk > 0. Then we have Di,a(t) < 0 at disequilibrium, since -Pk > 0 for k K+ and -Pk < 0 for k E K-from the construction of the process (T).
Admitting these points, we can reconstruct Allais' argument in terms of our own model (T) under assumptions (S) and (W)
With some complications due to the fact that 1)a(t) does not exist everywhere, we are able to show that lDa(t) decreases along with the solution of (T) and P(t) converges to equilibrium.
EXAMPLES OF INSTABILITY (SCARF)
In the preceeding sections, an example of a stable tatonnement process is shown. Is the tatonnement process generally stable without any restrictions such as gross substitutability? The answer is no, because we have an example of instability due to Scarf [55] .
Consider the case of three individuals, n = 3, and three commodities, m = 3. Let the utility function of the first, second, and third individuals, respectively, be is (1, 1, 1) . On the other hand, by differentiating with respect to time, it can be shown that P1 (t) P2(t) P3(t) = P1(0) P2(0) P3(0) for t > 0, and P(t) never reaches equilibrium. In this example, since EjP2j(t) = E1P(0), prices still remain close to equilibrium if initially they are sufficiently close to it. Therefore, stability in the sense of Lyapunov (Section 2.3) is obtained although global stability is not established.
It is known that the stability condition is satisfied if asymmetrical income effects are neglected.27 In this example, on the contrary, substitution effects do not exist and income effects are dominating. It has been long conjectured that instability, if any, might be due to the income effect, and in Scarf's example this is exactly the case.
One might object to the special properties of the above mentioned example. An example of a more general type is also given in Scarf [55] . Though it is difficult to characterize precisely those markets that are unstable, it is rather clear that instability is a relatively common phenomenon.
Judging from these examples, we must admit that the tatonnement process (T) is not perfectly reliable as a computing device to solve the system of equations for general economic equilibrium (e). It is possible to interprete these instability examples as showing that the difficulty is essentially due to the assumption of tatonnement (no trade out of equilibrium) and to conclude that the tatonnement process (T) does not provide a correct representation of the dynamics of markets. See Hahn [23a].
NON-TATONNEMENT PROCESSES
The failure of the general stability of the tatonnement process (T) suggests the study of the stability of the non-tatonnement processes (NT) (Section 4.2).
Let us assume as a transaction rule that no transaction on credit is permitted, i.e., all transactions should be of the barter type in the nontatonnement process. Since in a barter exchange, to get something one must offer something else of the same value in return, such an exchange does not alter the value of the commodity stocks held by an individual, i.e., his income. It may therefore be appropriate to assume the following restrictions on the functions F (see Negishi 10. THE HAHN PROCESS 10.1. In the non-tatonnement process (NT), it is assumed that the opportunity for an individual to change his stock of commodities through exchange depends generally on prices and the distribution of commodities among individuals. In other words, the individual's opportunity to change his commodity stock depends on the plans of other individuals to change theirs. If there is a surplus of a commodity, i.e., if the total amount individuals want to increase their stock of this commodity is less than the amount they want to part with, any individual who seeks to increase his stock can easily 32 I.e., the set of distributions at which everybody is not worse off than at the distribution X. 33 The set of Pareto-optimal distributions, or, in other words, points where the indifference curves of two individuals are tangent one to another. 
1. CONCLUDING REMARKS -SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES
To conclude this survey, let me state a number of problems which have remained rather untouched so far but should be studied extensively hereafter.
As is mentioned in Section 4.2 and footnotes 7 and 31, the process of price change in accord with excess demand may not be generally correct except in the case of tatonnement in a perfectly organized market. It would seem worthwhile to construct various models of a price formation process for the less organized markets, i.e., a series of bargains among individuals with or without recontract. Study of the non-competitive price formation process with price leadership or full-cost-pricing may also be interesting. The price formation process can be extended over Hicksian weeks. We may cite, for example, the cobweb process, the process with interactions between expectations and inventory fluctuations, and the Marshallian dynamic process (Section 2.1). The stability of these processes, as well as of the magnificent dynamic processes cited in Section 2.1, might well be analysed by methods and tools developed in the study of tatonnement and non-tatonnement stability.
The dynamic model analysed in this article has been of differential or continuous-time type. Models of difference or discrete-time type have also been studied. Models of these two types are simple and convenient from the mathematical point of view. The introduction of lagged adjustments (Section 2.1), however, will sometimes require the study of general mixed, discrete and continuous, time models.
We discussed in Section 2.2 the need to study stability. It should be mentioned that the various reasons given there suggest the need not only for stability, i.e., convergence to equilibrium, but also for quick convergence to equilibrium. The speed with which the system converges to equilibrium must also be estimated.34
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